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/*
* imap.c -- IMAP2bis/IMAP4 protocol methods
*
* Copyright 1997 by Eric S. Raymond
* For license terms, see the file COPYING in this directory.
*/
#include "config.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#if defined(STDC_HEADERS)
#include <stdlib.h>
#endif
#include "fetchmail.h"
#include "socket.h"
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
#if defined (__bsdi__)
#include <des.h>
#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
#endif
#if defined (__FreeBSD__) || defined(__linux__)
#define krb_get_err_text(e) (krb_err_txt[e])
#endif
#include <krb.h>
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
#ifndef strstr /* glibc-2.1 declares this as a macro */
extern char *strstr(); /* needed on sysV68 R3V7.1. */
#endif /* strstr */
/* imap_version values */
#define IMAP2 -1 /* IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS, RFC1176 */
#define IMAP4 0 /* IMAP4 rev 0, RFC1730 */
#define IMAP4rev1 1 /* IMAP4 rev 1, RFC2060 */
static int count, seen, recent, unseen, deletions,expunged, imap_version;
static char capabilities[POPBUFSIZE+1];
int imap_ok(int sock, char *argbuf)
/* parse command response */
{
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
seen = 0;
do {
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
/* interpret untagged status responses */
if (strstr(buf, "CAPABILITY"))
strncpy(capabilities, buf + 12, sizeof(capabilities));
if (strstr(buf, "EXISTS"))
count = atoi(buf+2);
if (strstr(buf, "RECENT"))
recent = atoi(buf+2);
if (strstr(buf, "UNSEEN"))
{
char *cp;
/*
* Handle both "* 42 UNSEEN" (if tha ever happens) and
* "* OK [UNSEEN 42] 42". Note that what this gets us is
* a minimum index, not a count.
*/
unseen = 0;
for (cp = buf; *cp && !isdigit(*cp); cp++)
continue;
unseen = atoi(cp);
}
if (strstr(buf, "FLAGS"))
seen = (strstr(buf, "Seen") != (char *)NULL);
} while
(tag[0] != '\0' && strncmp(buf, tag, strlen(tag)));
if (tag[0] == '\0')
{
if (argbuf)
strcpy(argbuf, buf);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
else
{
char *cp;
/* skip the tag */
for (cp = buf; !isspace(*cp); cp++)
continue;
while (isspace(*cp))
cp++;
if (strncmp(cp, "OK", 2) == 0)
{
if (argbuf)
strcpy(argbuf, cp);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
else if (strncmp(cp, "BAD", 2) == 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
else
return(PS_PROTOCOL);
}
}
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
typedef int int32;
#elif SIZEOF_SHORT == 4
typedef short int32;
#elif SIZEOF_LONG == 4
typedef long int32;
#else
#error Cannot deduce a 32-bit-type
#endif
static int do_rfc1731(int sock, char *truename)
/* authenticate as per RFC1731 -- note 32-bit integer requirement here */
{
int result = 0, len;
char buf1[4096], buf2[4096];
union {
int32 cint;
char cstr[4];
} challenge1, challenge2;
char srvinst[INST_SZ];
char *p;
char srvrealm[REALM_SZ];
KTEXT_ST authenticator;
CREDENTIALS credentials;
char tktuser[MAX_K_NAME_SZ+1+INST_SZ+1+REALM_SZ+1];
char tktinst[INST_SZ];
char tktrealm[REALM_SZ];
des_cblock session;
des_key_schedule schedule;
gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE KERBEROS_V4");
/* The data encoded in the first ready response contains a random
* 32-bit number in network byte order. The client should respond
* with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for the principal
* "imap.hostname@realm", where "hostname" is the first component
* of the host name of the server with all letters in lower case
* and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the server. The
* encrypted checksum field included within the Kerberos
* authenticator should contain the server provided 32-bit number
* in network byte order.
*/
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
return result;
}
len = from64tobits(challenge1.cstr, buf1);
if (len < 0) {
error(0, -1, "could not decode initial BASE64 challenge");
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
/* Client responds with a Kerberos ticket and an authenticator for
* the principal "imap.hostname@realm" where "hostname" is the
* first component of the host name of the server with all letters
* in lower case and where "realm" is the Kerberos realm of the
* server. The encrypted checksum field included within the
* Kerberos authenticator should contain the server-provided
* 32-bit number in network byte order.
*/
strncpy(srvinst, truename, (sizeof srvinst)-1);
srvinst[(sizeof srvinst)-1] = '\0';
for (p = srvinst; *p; p++) {
if (isupper(*p)) {
*p = tolower(*p);
}
}
strncpy(srvrealm, (char *)krb_realmofhost(srvinst), (sizeof srvrealm)-1);
srvrealm[(sizeof srvrealm)-1] = '\0';
if (p = strchr(srvinst, '.')) {
*p = '\0';
}
result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm, 0);
if (result) {
error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
result = krb_get_cred("imap", srvinst, srvrealm, &credentials);
if (result) {
error(0, -1, "krb_get_cred: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
memcpy(session, credentials.session, sizeof session);
memset(&credentials, 0, sizeof credentials);
des_key_sched(session, schedule);
result = krb_get_tf_fullname(TKT_FILE, tktuser, tktinst, tktrealm);
if (result) {
error(0, -1, "krb_get_tf_fullname: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (strcmp(tktuser, user) != 0) {
error(0, -1, "principal %s in ticket does not match -u %s", tktuser,
user);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (tktinst[0]) {
error(0, 0, "non-null instance (%s) might cause strange behavior",
tktinst);
strcat(tktuser, ".");
strcat(tktuser, tktinst);
}
if (strcmp(tktrealm, srvrealm) != 0) {
strcat(tktuser, "@");
strcat(tktuser, tktrealm);
}
result = krb_mk_req(&authenticator, "imap", srvinst, srvrealm,
challenge1.cint);
if (result) {
error(0, -1, "krb_mq_req: %s", krb_get_err_text(result));
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
}
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* Upon decrypting and verifying the ticket and authenticator, the
* server should verify that the contained checksum field equals
* the original server provided random 32-bit number. Should the
* verification be successful, the server must add one to the
* checksum and construct 8 octets of data, with the first four
* octets containing the incremented checksum in network byte
* order, the fifth octet containing a bit-mask specifying the
* protection mechanisms supported by the server, and the sixth
* through eighth octets containing, in network byte order, the
* maximum cipher-text buffer size the server is able to receive.
* The server must encrypt the 8 octets of data in the session key
* and issue that encrypted data in a second ready response. The
* client should consider the server authenticated if the first
* four octets the un-encrypted data is equal to one plus the
* checksum it previously sent.
*/
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
/* The client must construct data with the first four octets
* containing the original server-issued checksum in network byte
* order, the fifth octet containing the bit-mask specifying the
* selected protection mechanism, the sixth through eighth octets
* containing in network byte order the maximum cipher-text buffer
* size the client is able to receive, and the following octets
* containing a user name string. The client must then append
* from one to eight octets so that the length of the data is a
* multiple of eight octets. The client must then PCBC encrypt the
* data with the session key and respond to the second ready
* response with the encrypted data. The server decrypts the data
* and verifies the contained checksum. The username field
* identifies the user for whom subsequent IMAP operations are to
* be performed; the server must verify that the principal
* identified in the Kerberos ticket is authorized to connect as
* that user. After these verifications, the authentication
* process is complete.
*/
len = from64tobits(buf2, buf1);
if (len < 0) {
error(0, -1, "could not decode BASE64 ready response");
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
des_ecb_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf2, (des_cblock *)buf2, schedule, 0);
memcpy(challenge2.cstr, buf2, 4);
if (ntohl(challenge2.cint) != challenge1.cint + 1) {
error(0, -1, "challenge mismatch");
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
memset(authenticator.dat, 0, sizeof authenticator.dat);
result = htonl(challenge1.cint);
memcpy(authenticator.dat, &result, sizeof result);
/* The protection mechanisms and their corresponding bit-masks are as
* follows:
*
* 1 No protection mechanism
* 2 Integrity (krb_mk_safe) protection
* 4 Privacy (krb_mk_priv) protection
*/
authenticator.dat[4] = 1;
len = strlen(tktuser);
strncpy(authenticator.dat+8, tktuser, len);
authenticator.length = len + 8 + 1;
while (authenticator.length & 7) {
authenticator.length++;
}
des_pcbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)authenticator.dat,
(des_cblock *)authenticator.dat, authenticator.length, schedule,
&session, 1);
to64frombits(buf1, authenticator.dat, authenticator.length);
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
error(0, 0, "IMAP> %s", buf1);
}
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
else {
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
}
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
#ifdef GSSAPI
#define GSSAUTH_P_NONE 1
#define GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY 2
#define GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY 4
static int do_gssauth(int sock, char *hostname, char *username)
{
gss_buffer_desc request_buf, send_token;
gss_buffer_t sec_token;
gss_name_t target_name;
gss_ctx_id_t context;
gss_OID mech_name;
gss_qop_t quality;
int cflags;
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
char buf1[8192], buf2[8192], server_conf_flags;
unsigned long buf_size;
int result;
/* first things first: get an imap ticket for host */
sprintf(buf1, "imap@%s", hostname);
request_buf.value = buf1;
request_buf.length = strlen(buf1) + 1;
maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &request_buf, gss_nt_service_name,
&target_name);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
error(0, -1, "Couldn't get service name for [%s]", buf1);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
else if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, target_name, &request_buf,
&mech_name);
error(0, 0, "Using service name [%s]",request_buf.value);
maj_stat = gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &request_buf);
}
gen_send(sock, "AUTHENTICATE GSSAPI");
/* upon receipt of the GSSAPI authentication request, server returns
* null data ready response. */
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
return result;
}
/* now start the security context initialisation loop... */
sec_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0,0,"Sending credentials");
do {
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
&context, target_name, NULL, 0, 0, NULL, sec_token, NULL,
&send_token, &cflags, NULL);
if (maj_stat!=GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat!=GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
error(0, -1,"Error exchanging credentials");
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
/* wake up server and await NO response */
SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0,0,"IMAP> %s", buf1);
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
return result;
}
request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
request_buf.value = buf2;
sec_token = &request_buf;
}
} while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &target_name);
/* get security flags and buffer size */
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1)) {
return result;
}
request_buf.length = from64tobits(buf2, buf1 + 2);
request_buf.value = buf2;
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context, &request_buf, &send_token,
&cflags, &quality);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
error(0,-1,"Couldn't unwrap security level data");
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0,0,"Credential exchange complete");
/* first octet is security levels supported. We want none, for now */
server_conf_flags = ((char *)send_token.value)[0];
if ( !(((char *)send_token.value)[0] & GSSAUTH_P_NONE) ) {
error(0,-1,"Server requires integrity and/or privacy");
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
((char *)send_token.value)[0] = 0;
buf_size = ntohl(*((long *)send_token.value));
/* we don't care about buffer size if we don't wrap data */
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &send_token);
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
error(0,0,"Unwrapped security level flags: %s%s%s",
server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_NONE ? "N" : "-",
server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_INTEGRITY ? "I" : "-",
server_conf_flags & GSSAUTH_P_PRIVACY ? "C" : "-");
error(0,0,"Maximum GSS token size is %ld",buf_size);
}
/* now respond in kind (hack!!!) */
buf_size = htonl(buf_size); /* do as they do... only matters if we do enc */
memcpy(buf1, &buf_size, 4);
buf1[0] = GSSAUTH_P_NONE;
strcpy(buf1+4, username); /* server decides if princ is user */
request_buf.length = 4 + strlen(username) + 1;
request_buf.value = buf1;
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, context, 0, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &request_buf,
&cflags, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
error(0,-1,"Error creating security level request");
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
to64frombits(buf1, send_token.value, send_token.length);
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE) {
error(0,0,"Requesting authorisation as %s", username);
error(0,0,"IMAP> %s",buf1);
}
SockWrite(sock, buf1, strlen(buf1));
SockWrite(sock, "\r\n", 2);
/* we should be done. Get status and finish up */
if (result = gen_recv(sock, buf1, sizeof buf1))
return result;
if (strstr(buf1, "OK")) {
/* flush security context */
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "Releasing GSS credentials");
maj_stat = gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &context, &send_token);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
error(0, -1, "Error releasing credentials");
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
/* send_token may contain a notification to the server to flush
* credentials. RFC 1731 doesn't specify what to do, and since this
* support is only for authentication, we'll assume the server
* knows enough to flush its own credentials */
return PS_SUCCESS;
}
return PS_AUTHFAIL;
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
int imap_getauth(int sock, struct query *ctl, char *greeting)
/* apply for connection authorization */
{
int ok = 0;
/* probe to see if we're running IMAP4 and can use RFC822.PEEK */
capabilities[0] = '\0';
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "CAPABILITY")) == PS_SUCCESS)
{
/* UW-IMAP server 10.173 notifies in all caps */
if (strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4rev1") || strstr(capabilities, "IMAP4REV1"))
{
imap_version = IMAP4rev1;
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 1");
}
else
{
imap_version = IMAP4;
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP4 rev 0");
}
}
else if (ok == PS_ERROR)
{
imap_version = IMAP2;
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "Protocol identified as IMAP2 or IMAP2BIS");
}
else
return(ok);
peek_capable = (imap_version >= IMAP4);
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=GSSAPI"))
{
if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
{
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "GSS authentication is supported");
return do_gssauth(sock, ctl->server.truename, ctl->remotename);
}
}
else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_GSS)
{
error(0,-1, "Required GSS capability not supported by server");
return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
#ifdef KERBEROS_V4
if (strstr(capabilities, "AUTH=KERBEROS_V4"))
{
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "KERBEROS_V4 authentication is supported");
if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
{
if ((ok = do_rfc1731(sock, ctl->server.truename)))
{
if (outlevel == O_VERBOSE)
error(0, 0, "IMAP> *");
SockWrite(sock, "*\r\n", 3);
}
return(ok);
}
/* else fall through to ourdinary AUTH=LOGIN case */
}
else if (ctl->server.protocol == P_IMAP_K4)
{
error(0,-1, "Required KERBEROS_V4 capability not supported by server");
return(PS_AUTHFAIL);
}
#endif /* KERBEROS_V4 */
/* try to get authorized in the ordinary (AUTH=LOGIN) way */
ok = gen_transact(sock, "LOGIN %s \"%s\"", ctl->remotename, ctl->password);
if (ok)
return(ok);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int internal_expunge(int sock)
/* ship an expunge, resetting associated counters */
{
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXPUNGE")))
return(ok);
expunged += deletions;
deletions = 0;
#ifdef IMAP_UID /* not used */
expunge_uids(ctl);
#endif /* IMAP_UID */
}
static int imap_getrange(int sock,
struct query *ctl,
const char *folder,
int *countp, int *newp)
/* get range of messages to be fetched */
{
int ok;
/* find out how many messages are waiting */
recent = unseen = -1;
if (pass > 1)
{
/*
* We have to have an expunge here, otherwise the re-poll will
* infinite-loop picking up un-expunged message.
*/
ok = 0;
if (deletions && ctl->expunge > 1)
internal_expunge(sock);
count = -1;
if (ok || gen_transact(sock, "NOOP"))
{
error(0, 0, "re-poll failed");
return(ok);
}
else if (count == -1) /* no EXISTS response to NOOP */
{
count = recent = 0;
unseen = -1;
}
}
else
{
if (!check_only)
ok = gen_transact(sock, "SELECT %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
else
ok = gen_transact(sock, "EXAMINE %s", folder ? folder : "INBOX");
if (ok != 0)
{
error(0, 0, "mailbox selection failed");
return(ok);
}
}
*countp = count;
/*
* Note: because IMAP has an is_old method, this number is used
* only for the "X messages (Y unseen)" notification. Accordingly
* it doesn't matter much that it can be wrong (e.g. if we see an
* UNSEEN response but not all messages above the first UNSEEN one
* are likewise).
*/
if (unseen >= 0) /* optional, but better if we see it */
*newp = count - unseen + 1;
else if (recent >= 0) /* mandatory */
*newp = recent;
else
*newp = -1; /* should never happen, RECENT is mandatory */
expunged = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_getsizes(int sock, int count, int *sizes)
/* capture the sizes of all messages */
{
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
/*
* Some servers (as in, PMDF5.1-9.1 under OpenVMS 6.1)
* won't accept 1:1 as valid set syntax. Some implementors
* should be taken out and shot for excessive anality.
*/
if (count == 1)
gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1 RFC822.SIZE", count);
else
gen_send(sock, "FETCH 1:%d RFC822.SIZE", count);
for (;;)
{
int num, size, ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
else if (sscanf(buf, "* %d FETCH (RFC822.SIZE %d)", &num, &size) == 2)
sizes[num - 1] = size;
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_is_old(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* is the given message old? */
{
int ok;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock, "FETCH %d FLAGS", number)) != 0)
return(PS_ERROR);
return(seen);
}
static int imap_fetch_headers(int sock, struct query *ctl,int number,int *lenp)
/* request headers of nth message */
{
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1];
int num;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
* This is blessed by RFC 1176, RFC1730, RFC2060.
* According to the RFCs, it should *not* set the \Seen flag.
*/
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.HEADER", number);
/* looking for FETCH response */
do {
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
} while
(sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH (%*s {%d}", &num, lenp) != 2);
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
else
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_fetch_body(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number, int *lenp)
/* request body of nth message */
{
char buf [POPBUFSIZE+1], *cp;
int num;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
* If we're using IMAP4, we can fetch the message without setting its
* seen flag. This is good! It means that if the protocol exchange
* craps out during the message, it will still be marked `unseen' on
* the server.
*
* However...*don't* do this if we're using keep to suppress deletion!
* In that case, marking the seen flag is the only way to prevent the
* message from being re-fetched on subsequent runs.
*/
switch (imap_version)
{
case IMAP4rev1: /* RFC 2060 */
if (!ctl->keep)
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY.PEEK[TEXT]", number);
else
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d BODY[TEXT]", number);
break;
case IMAP4: /* RFC 1730 */
if (!ctl->keep)
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT.PEEK", number);
else
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
break;
default: /* RFC 1176 */
gen_send(sock, "FETCH %d RFC822.TEXT", number);
break;
}
/* looking for FETCH response */
do {
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
} while
(sscanf(buf+2, "%d FETCH", &num) != 1);
if (num != number)
return(PS_ERROR);
/* try to extract a length */
if ((cp = strchr(buf, '{')))
*lenp = atoi(cp + 1);
else
*lenp = 0;
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_trail(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* discard tail of FETCH response after reading message text */
{
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
/* number -= expunged; */
for (;;)
{
char buf[POPBUFSIZE+1];
int ok;
if ((ok = gen_recv(sock, buf, sizeof(buf))))
return(ok);
/* UW IMAP returns "OK FETCH", Cyrus returns "OK Completed" */
if (strstr(buf, "OK"))
break;
}
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_delete(int sock, struct query *ctl, int number)
/* set delete flag for given message */
{
int ok;
/* expunges change the fetch numbers */
number -= expunged;
/*
* Use SILENT if possible as a minor throughput optimization.
* Note: this has been dropped from IMAP4rev1.
*/
if ((ok = gen_transact(sock,
imap_version == IMAP4
? "STORE %d +FLAGS.SILENT (\\Deleted)"
: "STORE %d +FLAGS (\\Deleted)",
number)))
return(ok);
else
deletions++;
/*
* We do an expunge after ctl->expunge messages, rather than
* just before quit, so that a line hit during a long session
* won't result in lots of messages being fetched again during
* the next session.
*/
if (NUM_NONZERO(ctl->expunge) && (deletions % ctl->expunge) == 0)
internal_expunge(sock);
return(PS_SUCCESS);
}
static int imap_logout(int sock, struct query *ctl)
/* send logout command */
{
/* if expunges after deletion have been suppressed, ship one now */
if (NUM_SPECIFIED(ctl->expunge) && NUM_ZERO(ctl->expunge) && deletions)
internal_expunge(sock);
return(gen_transact(sock, "LOGOUT"));
}
const static struct method imap =
{
"IMAP", /* Internet Message Access Protocol */
#if INET6
"imap",
#else /* INET6 */
143, /* standard IMAP2bis/IMAP4 port */
#endif /* INET6 */
TRUE, /* this is a tagged protocol */
FALSE, /* no message delimiter */
imap_ok, /* parse command response */
imap_getauth, /* get authorization */
imap_getrange, /* query range of messages */
imap_getsizes, /* get sizes of messages (used for --limit option */
imap_is_old, /* no UID check */
imap_fetch_headers, /* request given message headers */
imap_fetch_body, /* request given message body */
imap_trail, /* eat message trailer */
imap_delete, /* delete the message */
imap_logout, /* expunge and exit */
TRUE, /* yes, we can re-poll */
};
int doIMAP(struct query *ctl)
/* retrieve messages using IMAP Version 2bis or Version 4 */
{
return(do_protocol(ctl, &imap));
}
/* imap.c ends here */
These are the contents of the former NiCE NeXT User Group NeXTSTEP/OpenStep software archive, currently hosted by Netfuture.ch.